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HOW FOLK BELIEFS ABOUT FREE WILL
INFLUENCE SENTENCING: A NEW TARGET
FOR THE NEURO-DETERMINIST CRITICS OF
CRIMINAL LAW
Emad H. Atiq*

Do recent results in neuroscience and psychology that portray our choices as
predeterminedthreaten to undermine the assumptions about )fee will" that
drive criminallaw? This article answers in the affirmative, and offers a novel
argumentfor the transformativeimport of modern science. It also explains why
a revision in the law's assumptions is morally desirable.Problematicassumptions
about free will have a role to play in criminal law not because they underlie
substantive legal doctrine or retributive theory, but because everyday actors in
the sentencingprocess are authorizedto make irreducibly moral determinations
outside of the ordinarydoctrinalframework. jurors,judges, and legislators are
each required,at key points in the sentencingprocess, to make moraljudgments
that cannot be reached without reference to the person ' own understandingof
free will. As a result, sentencing actorsgive legal effect to widely heldfolk beliefi
aboutfree will-beliefi that the evidence suggests are both scientfically suspect
and morally distorting. The relevant belief make adjudicators less likely to
attend to the underlyingcauses ofcrime, such as social deprivation-atendency
that biases adjudicatorsagainst relevantargumentsfor mitigation in sentencing.
Modern science could have an important corrective effect in this context.
Keywords: fee will, criminal responsibility, determinism, neuroscience,
mitigation
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INTRODUCTION
Advances in neuroscience, behavioral psychology, and genetics have led to
a number of important discoveries about brain function and human behavior. These discoveries portray human decision making as a thoroughly
natural and deterministic process, involving complex interactions between
electrical impulses in the brain governed by the laws of physics. Many
believe that the modern scientific understanding of individual choice debunks the widely held assumption that human behavior is caused by an
internal faculty in agents called "free will."' This line of reasoning is
especially troubling for those who think that American criminal law presupposes the existence of free will and that the law's moral legitimacy
depends on the reasonableness of its assumptions about human behavior.
On a fairly common view, American criminal law treats individuals,
generally, as rational actors capable of "voluntary control"-if the law's
way of regarding those who are subject to its demands reflects an outdated
commitment to the existence of free will, then the criminal justice system
faces a real challenge. Scientists skeptical of free will have already begun
critiquing legal doctrines and theories of punishment that they perceive as
founded on faulty assumptions about human behavior. 2 Their provocative

i. See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y BIOLOGICAL Sa. 1776,
1777 (2004) ("[Tlhere is not a shred of scientific evidence to support the existence of [free
will] ... any scientifically respectable discussion of free will requires the rejection of... the
panicky metaphysics of libertarianism."); David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial,ATLANTIC
MONTHLY (July 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2ou/o7/the-brainon-trial/8520/ (arguing that neuroscience is making it seem increasingly unlikely that we
have free will); Tim Bayne, Liber and The Casefor Free Will Skepticism, in FREE WILL AND
MODERN SCIENCE (Richard Swinburne ed., zoz) (observing that many take Benjamin
Libet's psychological studies to support skepticism about free will).
2. See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, supra note i, at 1778 (observing that
neuroscience will radically transform criminal law by undermining belief in free will); David
Eagleman, Neuroscience and the Law, 16 Hous. LAW. 36,37 (zoo8). See also Luis E. Chiesa,
Punishing without Free Will, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=18O4 4 68; Antoine Bechara & Kelly Burns, Decision Making
and Free Will: A Neuroscience Perspective,25 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 263, 263 (2007) ("[T]he
idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making."); Stephen O'Hanlon, Towards a More ReasonableApproach to
Free Will in CriminalLaw, 7 CARDOZO PUB. LAW POL'Y & ETHICS J. 395, 395-96 (2009)
(arguing that the "strong presumption of free will" underlying theoretical justifications for
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claims have fueled heated academic debate over the relationship between
modern science and the law's conception of the criminal actor.3 Meanwhile,
defense lawyers have begun using state-of-the-art neuroscience to challenge
the volitional capacities and criminal responsibility of defendants4 ; what were
once issues confined to purely academic debate have become central to
recently litigated cases.
This article offers a novel take on whether modern science threatens to
undermine and supplant the criminal law's assumptions about human
behavior. It argues that the science will live up to its radical promise but
in a way that commentators on both sides of the issue have missed. The
academic debate has already gone through a round of argument and counterargument, with scholars focusing exclusively on the legal concept of free
will and its relationship to deterministic science. For instance, commentators
have carefully investigated what it means for a criminal to act "freely" in the
sense required by such criminal law doctrines as the "voluntary act" requirement and whether the possibility of "free action" in this technical, doctrinal
sense is supported by modern science. 5 Alternatively, commentators have
punishment is called into question by the fields of genetics and neuroscience); Matthew
Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in CriminalLaw: The True Impact of the Genetics
Revolution, 52 DUKE L.J. 1031 (2003) (arguing that theoretical justifications for criminal
punishment assume the existence of free will, in a way that is undermined by genetics).
Amanda C. Pustilnik observes that "[s]ince 2000 alone, over 20o articles have appeared in
law reviews on the subject of criminal law and neuroscience." Violence on the Brain: A
Critique ofNeuroscience in CriminalLaw, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. I83, 186 n.Io (2009).
For media coverage of the debate, see, e.g., Editorial, Free to Choose?Modern Neuroscience Is
Eroding the Idea of Free Will, EcoNoMIST, Dec. 19, 2oo6.
3. See, e.g., Stephen Morse, Genetics and Criminal Responsibility, 15 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE Sci. 378, 379 (zon1) (denying that modern neuroscience and genetics will have any
transformative effect on criminal law); Stephen Morse, Lost in Translation?:An Essay on Law
and Neuroscience, in LAW & NEUROSCIENCE: 13 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 529 (Michael
Freeman ed., 2011) [hereinafter Morse, Lost in Translation] (critiquing the reformist position
generally); Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges
to Responsibilityfom Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L Sa. & TECH. I (2oo8) [hereinafter Morse,
Determinism]; Gideon Yaffe, Libet and the Criminal Law's Voluntary Act Requirement, in
CONscIoUs WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY, Ch.16 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel
eds., zoo), http://www-bcf.usc.edu/ yaffe/assets/lawandaction/Libet&Crim%2oLawFinal.pdf; Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Neuroscience, Normativity, and Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT (Thomas Nadelhoffer ed., forthcoming), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=i 7 8382 3 . Views discussed infra Part 1.
4. See infra Part L.B.

5. See sources cited supra notes 2, 3-
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studied the assumptions about free will that underpin the foundational,
moral principles of punishment, such as the principles of retribution articulated by philosophers of criminal law." This enduring focus on doctrine and
theory has obscured the more significant ways in which assumptions about
free will drive criminal law. It turns out that the technical notion of free will
presupposed by legal doctrine and retributive theory departs significantly
from the ordinary "folk" concept of free will-that is to say, the average
person's understanding of what it means to act freely; folk beliefs about free
will influence criminal law, albeit in an indirect and subtle way, and it is here
that the challenge from modern science is most relevant.
Potentially problematic assumptions about free will have a role to play in
criminal law not because they underlie substantive legal doctrine or retributive theory, but because everyday actors in the sentencing process are
authorized to make irreducibly moral determinations outside of the ordinary doctrinal framework. These moral determinations contain implicit
judgments about free will. Jurors, judges, and legislators are each required,
at key points in the sentencing process, to make moral judgments that
cannot be reached without reference to the person's own understanding of
human agency. As a result, sentencing actors give legal effect to widely held
folk beliefs about free will, beliefs that are in fact threatened by modern
science.
The way that jurors, judges, and legislators conceive of human agency
will undergo change, but not because modern science threatens to persuade
the general public that criminals altogether lack free will. Instead, modern
biological science will change adjudicators' assumptions by showing that
free will has a much smaller role to play in human behavior and that the
conditions for moral responsibility are instantiated far less frequently than
people tend to think. A large body of empirical evidence suggests that
people tend to ignore the ways in which human behavior is causally influenced by factors like social deprivation and mental defect because of exaggerated beliefs about the causal significance of "free will." In other words,
people tend to explain by default most criminal conduct in terms of the
offender's "evil will" and, as a result, under-recognize the influence of environmental and biological factors. If sentencing actors are indeed vulnerable
to this tendency, then modern science really does have radical implications
for criminal law. By exposing the wider public and key sentencing actors to
6. See sources cited supra notes

2,

3.
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increasingly vivid illustrations of the underlying causes of human misbehavior, modern science will move the legal system toward a more realistic view of
why criminals behave the way they do-a view that places far less explanatory emphasis on free will.
Not only is this change in the assumptions that drive criminal law
forthcoming, the change is morally desirable. As they begin to see criminogenic factors like social deprivation and genetic predisposition as causally
implicated in crime, sentencing actors will in turn become more responsive
to moral arguments for mitigation that appeal to the role of such factors in
causing bad behavior. In other words, modern biological science promises
to bring the punitive instincts of the general public and key sentencing
actors closer in line with the ideals of retributive proportionality and the
requirements of justice. By single-mindedly focusing on the doctrinal or
"legal" concept of free will, and by asking whether assumptions about free
will can be completely eliminated from the criminal justice system, existing
scholarship has obscured the most powerful ways in which modern science
could have a corrective moral influence on criminal law.
The question that motivates this article lies at the intersection of criminal law, modern biological science, and moral philosophy-informed
engagement with the question thus requires some exposure to all three
disciplines. Part I begins with a basic overview of the disagreement between
criminal law scholars and the "free will skeptics" or, as this article refers to
them, "reformists." 7 It explains how reformists have seized on recent experimental results to pose anew a challenge to free will and criminal responsibility that is as old as moral philosophy. It engages with the response from
criminal law scholars who dismiss the challenge by pointing out that where
legal doctrine and retributive theory refer to "free will," they refer to a fairly
technical legal term of art. The legal concept of "free will" withstands
scientific scrutiny; criminals are able to act "freely" in the relevant sense
despite recent developments in science.
The remainder of the article focuses on developing an alternative and
more plausible line of argument on behalf of reformists. Part II provides
concrete examples of discretionary moral adjudication in the criminal justice system. An analysis of relevant case law underscores the moral content
of judgments that discretionary actors in the criminal justice system are
7. Note that the term "reformist" is not standardly used to refer to advocates of the
position described. The label is employed here for ease of discussion.
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authorized to make-judgments about proportionality and mitigation in
sentencing. Then, Part III demonstrates that the judgments made by discretionary actors are likely distorted by folk assumptions about free will.
Empirical evidence suggests that sentencing actors are vulnerable to the
tendency to over-estimate the causal significance of free will and, connectedly, under-recognize the influence of contextual, criminogenic factors on
behavior; as a result, sentencing actors tolerate harsher punishment than
they otherwise would. Part IV offers a moral philosophical explanation of
the empirical data. Individuals who have an exaggerated belief in free will
punish more harshly because their unrealistic assumptions about criminal
behavior render them insensitive to moral considerations that militate in
favor of restraint and mitigation in sentencing. Part V concludes by explaining how modern science could have an important corrective effect in
this context.

I. WILL MODERN SCIENCE TRANSFORM CRIMINAL
LAW?: THE REFORMIST THESIS AND ITS CRITICS
The structure of this Part is as follows. It begins with examples of recent
developments in science that have captured the imagination of reformists. It
explains how these developments are made to seem threatening to belief in
free will, and it situates the reformist attack on free will within a critique of
the criminal law's assumptions. Next, it describes the response from criminal
law scholars. Here, it becomes necessary to engage with the philosophical
literature on free will and determinism to show, in particular, that there are
ways of conceptualizing what it means to act freely that are consistent with
the new science; scholars of the law seize upon this fact to argue (quite
effectively) that the legal concept of "free will," as expressed in substantive
doctrine and retributive theory, is compatible with deterministic science.
This Part concludes by briefly considering some of the reasons why commentators on both sides of the debate have focussed on the technical notion
of free will that underpins criminal law doctrine and retributive theory.
A. Recent Developments in Science
Reformists motivate their position by drawing on a number of surprising
results in neuroscience, genetics, and cognitive psychology-results that
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purportedly undermine the belief that criminal, or otherwise immoral,
behavior is uniquely caused by an internal faculty in agents called "free
will."
The neuroscientist David Eagleman describes a strand of empirical work
that reveals causal links between identifiable brain abnormalities and violent or otherwise wrongful impulses in individuals.8 He describes how
tumors that impinge on a brain region called the amygdala-a region
involved in emotional regulation, especially of fear and aggression-can
cause individuals to act in uncharacteristically violent ways. 9 Similarly,
tumors in the prefrontal cortex can give rise to pedophilic and sexually
deviant urges in individuals.'o These urges seem to disappear when the
tumor is excised-a fact that further supports an inference of a causal link
between the brain abnormality and the behavioral disposition.I
Such findings reflect a basic tenet underlying contemporary neuroscience: that behavioral differences across individuals are fully a product of
subtle differences in brain function. Eagleman thinks that the general
public, impressed with the evidence that not everyone is biologically
"equipped" to make socially appropriate choices, will become doubtful
of their default assumption that criminal conduct reflects a wrongdoer's
"free choice"; Eagleman claims that "the most cursory examination of the
evidence demonstrates the limits of that ["free choice"] assumption."12
Another strand of research that has influenced the reformist movement
is best exemplified by Benjamin Libet's famous experiment. Libet demonstrated that whereas subjects become aware of an intention to commit
a basic voluntary act, like raising a hand, 200 milliseconds before the actual
act, there is a surge of nonconscious activity in their brains beginning 550
milliseconds before the act (referred to as the "readiness potential") that
seems to determine whether or not they commit the act.' 3 In other words,
the awareness of a decision to act seems to follow the unconscious neurological processes that appear to initiate action. Libet's studies suggest that
the raw feeling of choosing to act may be little more than the illusory
afterglow of a process initiated by the unconscious brain.
8. See Eagleman, supra note i, at i.
9. Id. at 2.

1o. Id.
n . Id.

Id. at i.
13. Yaffe, supra note 3, at i (describing Libet's experiments).
12.
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Reformists have drawn on Libet's results to argue that the empirical
evidence makes it seem unlikely that conscious volition has a significant
role to play in decision making." If "voluntary action" is distinguished
from nonvoluntary bodily movement on the basis that the former is
uniquely caused by a mental state of which the agent is conscious, then
Libet's studies would seem to cast doubt on the very possibility of voluntary action. His experiments suggest that complex neuronal processesprocesses that fall under the radar of conscious awareness-are causally
responsible for actions that we, perhaps mistakenly, consider as paradigmatically voluntary.
A third strand of research that proves useful to the reformist cause
reinforces our understanding of the link between criminality and
genetic-environmental predisposition. For instance, correlations between
convictions for crime and variations in the gene for monoamine oxidase A,
a protein that plays an important role in the brain, have been known since
at least 2oo2.'5 Sociological studies indicate that the MAOA variant, when
combined with adverse environmental stimuli like childhood maltreatment, strongly correlates with convictions for violent crime.1" Recent neuroscientific investigation has bolstered the view that the MAOA variant
combined with negative environmental stimuli causally predisposes individuals to crime. In particular, scientists have developed an understanding
of the neurobiological mechanisms by which the MAOA variant confers
risk of violent behavior: "[the variant] is linked to a neuro-transmitted
system and functional difference in brains areas known to be involved in
anger production and control."17 By providing causal explanation and data
on mechanism, neuroscience has lent greater plausibility to the view that an

14.

Id.

15. See H.G. Brunner, M. Nelen, X.O. Breakefield, H.H. Ropers, & B.A. van Oost,
Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the Structural Gene for Monoamine
Oxidase A., 262 SCIENCE 578 (1993); Avshalon Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of
Violence in MaltreatedChildren, 297 SCIENCE 85I (zoo2).
16. Matthew L. Baum, The Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) Genetic Predisposition to
Impulsive Violence: Is it Relevant to Criminal Trial, 6(2) NEUROETHICS 287-3o6 (2013),
http://philpapers.org/rec/BAUTMO-3 ("[Studies showed] although only 12% of the boys in
a sample of 1037 NZ children were maltreated and possessed the low MAOA genotype, they
were responsible for 44% of the convictions for violent crime.").
I7. Id at 18.
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unlucky genetic variant and a deprived childhood can substantially predispose individuals to criminal behavior.' 8
Reformists argue that the various strands of research taken together
undermine the notion that human behavior stems from a faculty in agents
called "free will," one that transcends the material brain and is undetermined by prior causes. The results underscore that differences in brain
function, and hence behavior, are determined by genetic and environmental variables-that is, factors over which we lack direct control.' 9 As further
studies convey this basic insight to society at large, modern science, the
argument goes, will erode the widely held belief in free will.

B. The Reformist Critique of Criminal Law
Notably, some of the scientific output discussed above is already being
introduced in criminal cases to support novel claims of mitigation or
excuse. In a 2007 case involving kidnapping and sexual abuse, the defense
introduced PET scans of the defendant's brain in an attempt to show that,
brain abnormalities rendered the defendant, Braunstein, incapable of forming intentions or plans during the sexual assault of a former coworker, and
thus he lacked the necessary mens rea. 0 Notably, the defense did not pursue
a traditional insanity plea. It attempted, instead, a defense based on a creative interpretation of scans showing dysfunction in Braunstein's frontal
lobe, the part of the brain that regulates personality, planning, and impulse
control. Similarly, in a Florida death penalty case, Sexton v. State, a psychologist testified that the defendant's impaired self-control, because of
18. Id. (observing that it isespecially plausible that the MAOA variant predisposes, given
insights from neuroscience).
19. It is worth pointing out that many critics of the reformist position accept this naturalistic conception of the human. See, e.g., Morse, Determinism, supra note 3, at 14
(observing that "[mlost philosophers and scientists believe that the universe is deterministic
or universally caused" and agreeing that "rationality demands" that we accept the nonexistence of free will). See generally Greene & Cohen, supra note i (noting the scientific
consensus around the deterministic conception of human behavior); Paul Bloom, Free Will
Does NotExist. So What?, CHRONICAL REVIEW, Mar. I8, 2012, http://chronicle.com/article/
Paul-Bloom/13xx70 (observing that most scientists and philosophers agree with the deterministic picture).
20. See Walter Glannon, What Neuroscience Can and Cannot Tell Us about Criminal
Responsibility, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: 13 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES l5 (Michael
Freeman ed., 2ou) (discussing the cases described here).
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brain abnormality, ought to be a mitigating factor against the death sentence; the psychologist presented brain scans that revealed dysfunction in
the defendant's prefrontal cortex.21 In the Supreme Court case Roper v.
Simmons, which held the death penalty unconstitutional as punishment for
murder by a juvenile, the American Medical Association filed an amicus
brief observing that "scientists can now demonstrate that adolescents are
immature not only to the observer's naked eye, but in the very fibers of
their brain." 22
Although the scientific evidence did not control the outcome in the
cases mentioned-Braunstein received a sentence of 18 years to life, the
trial court imposed the death penalty in Sexton, and the Court in Roper
made clear that the neuroscience was not an independent factor in its
holding-those championing the reformist cause remain optimistic. Reformists believe that we are at the cusp of a sea change in criminal law, and
that these initial cases reflect only the beginnings of a broader movement of
reform. Although the latest scientific results may not be influencing judicial
decisions at the moment, this will change once the deterministic conception of the human underlying modern science wins greater mainstream and
legal acceptance. The law will adapt and become more receptive to the full,
transformative import of the empirical evidence once its enduring assumptions about free will are systematically debunked.
One reformist camp contends that entrenched assumptions about free
will underpin the theoretical justifications for the criminal justice system, and
the way we sentence will change once those assumptions are finally defeated
by scientific progress. Greene and Cohen put forward a version of this
23
argument in an influential and much-discussed article. They observed that
criminal law relies on retributive theories of criminal punishment-theories
famously propounded by Immanuel Kant and others-according to which
criminal wrongdoers are punished because they deserve to be. The impulse to
visit retribution on criminals has a strong hold on us, and a retributive
Sexton v. State, 997 So.2d 1073, 1077 (Fla. zoo8).
American Medical Association, American Psychological Association, American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, American
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, National Association of Social Workers,
Missouri Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers, and National Mental
Health Association. Brief of amicus curiae supporting respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005). See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70 (zoo).
23. Greene & Cohen, supra note i, at 1776. See also Jones, supra note 2.
21.

22.
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penological scheme, they argued, to a large extent governs whom the law
punishes and by how much. But retributive theories presuppose the existence of free will. If your behavior is fully determined by factors over which
you had no control, it makes no sense to think that you deserve to be
punished for acting badly. 24 After all, biological and environmental determinism make a lottery of who ends up behaving badly and getting punished
for it. Greene and Cohen predict that the criminal law will have to revise its
rationales for punishing criminals as the law's default assumption that criminal actors have free will is comprehensively undermined.2 5
A second reformist camp believes that problematic assumptions about
free will find expression in substantive legal doctrine. The neuroscientist
David Eagleman 26 and law scholar Luis Chiesa 27 argue that criminal law
needs to change in the face of scientific determinism because criminal law
doctrine, in its requirements for criminal culpability, makes a default
assumption about the existence of free will. Chiesa, for example, contends
that the assumption that criminal actors have free will is embedded in
"many foundational doctrines of criminal law, including the voluntary act
requirement, the insanity defense and the general theory of excuse defenses." 28 As a result, "[o]ur criminal laws presuppose the existence of freely
willed actors." 2 9 Consider, for instance, the voluntary act requirement:
criminal liability depends on the defendant having engaged in the actus
reus ("guilty act") of the offense charged. 30 According to a basic principle of
24. Greene & Cohen, supra note i, at 1776, 1784 ("Free will as we ordinarily understand
it is an illusion generated by our cognitive architecture. Retributivist notions of criminal
responsibility ultimately depend on this illusion, and, if we are lucky, they will give way to
consequentialist ones, thus radically transforming our approach to criminal justice."). See
also Chiesa, supra note 2, at 12 (arguing that a rejection of retribution will lead to more
humane punishment because "blaming other people for their sins and crimes loses meaning
in a world without free will"); Jones, supra note 2.
25. Greene & Cohen, supra note i, at 1776.
26. See Eagleman, supra note 1, 27 (arguing that the legal system's treatment of individuals as "practical reasoners" assumes at bottom that we have free will-an assumption
threatened by neuroscience). See also Eagleman, supra note 2.
27. See Chiesa, supra note 2, at 18 (arguing that the law's voluntary act requirement
presupposes a notion of free will incompatible with determinism, and that similar assumptions "lie at the heart of many foundational doctrines of criminal law").
28. Id.
29. Id.

30. See Model Penal Code § 1.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A person is not
guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or
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criminal law, as articulated in the Model Penal Code, an act is guilty only if
"voluntary." Chiesa cites cases in which judges use the language of free will
to explain this notion of voluntariness. 3 ' For example, in U.S. v. Cullen,
the court observed that "in the narrowest sense, every crime must be the
product of the defendant's free will." 32 Such language seems to indicate
that the law's voluntary act requirement reflects a background presumption
that a wrongdoer's culpability is grounded in his having acted freely.
If either substantive criminal law doctrines or the moral theories that are
foundational to the criminal legal system have presumed the existence of
free will in a way that is inconsistent with the scientific worldview, then the
reformists would appear to have a point. Criminal actors, viewed through
the lens of legal doctrine and retributive theory, are presumed to have
a faculty that the science is showing they lack. Reformists like Greene,
Cohen, Eagleman, and Chiesa think that once the scientific conception of
the human wins greater mainstream acceptance, the law will have to stop
treating criminals as "freely willing actors," and that this will have a transformative impact on the way we punish. 33 The next Subpart expands on the

the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable."). The model penal code
gives little guidance on the concept of voluntariness, defining the term in the negativereflexes and bodily movements during sleep or lack of consciousness do not constitute
voluntary acts. Id. See also State v. Case, 672 A.2d 586, 589 (Me. 1996) ("To be voluntary an
act must be the result of an exercise of defendant's conscious choice to perform [it], and not
the result of reflex, convulsion.").
31. Chiesa, supra note 2, at 15, 17.
32. 454 F.2d 386, 390-91 (1971).
33. As the scholarly and media attention indicates, modern discoveries in neuroscience
resonate far beyond philosophical debate. Something like the modern reformist movement
was predicted decades ago by Meir Dan-Cohen: "There is no escaping the recognition that
the requirements of voluntariness are locked in a deadly, and possible losing, battle with
determinism. Scientific (psychological, biological, or medical) explanations... almost
invariably increase the deterministic element in our view of human conduct.... The more
such accounts we possess, the greater the encroachment on a presupposition of voluntariness
that underlies the criminal law." Actus Reus, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
20-21 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). The issue has attracted not only unfunded academic
interest but research generously funded by such sources as the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation. The MacArthur Foundation announced in 2007 a three-year grant
of $io million to establish the "Law and Neurosciences Project," which would explore the
question, "How would the law deal with theories that suggest that people's actions are not
the direct result of prior intentions, that free-will is an illusion, that consciousness itself is
a mere penumbra of the brain's activities?" Announcement of Law and Neuroscience Project,
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response from criminal law scholars and the moral philosophical tools they
use to counter reformist claims.
C. The Response from Law Scholars: "Compatibilism" about the
Legal Concept of Free Will
Both versions of the reformist argument have been pointedly criticized by
scholars of criminal law. The critics point out that philosophers have been
debating the relationship between deterministic science and free will for
millennia. A basic insight that emerges from this debate is that whether or
not the scientific worldview threatens belief in free will depends on what it
means to act freely-and what it means is controversial. The law scholars
have coalesced around the view that, at least as far as the criminal law is
concerned, the kind of "free will" that substantive doctrine and retributive theory require is compatible with science. In other words, the criminal law regards the culpable criminal actor as "free" in a way that is not at
all threatened by modern science.
Theorists draw a distinction between two basic ways of conceptualizing
what it means to have free will. An account of what it means to act freely is
described as "compatibilist" if it allows for the possibility of freely willed
action even if all our actions are fully determined by natural laws and
remote events in the past. 34 By contrast, on the "libertarian-incompatibilist" view, acting freely involves acting on the basis of a special capacity that
we possess only if the deterministic thesis is false. The distinction between
these different ways of conceptualizing free will turns out to be vital to the
resolution of the debate.
Although there are many flavors of "compatibilism," an illustrative
example of this type of view can be found in Harry Frankfurt's "hierarchical mesh theory of free will." 35 Frankfurt's view is discussed here merely as
an example of a theory of free will that is compatible with deterministic
science; the details of the view are not essential to this article's core argument. Frankfurt's mesh theory explains freely willed action as action that
stems from desires of a certain sort. According to the mesh theorist, a person
macfound.com, http://www.macfound.org/press/speeches/announcement-law-and-neuro
science-project-jonathan-fanton-federal-court-house-new-york-ny-october-9-zoo7/.
34. Anders Kaye, The Secret Politics of the Compatibilist CriminalLaw, 55 KAN. L. REV.
365, 374-79 (2007) (describing compatibilist accounts of free will).
35. Harry Frankfurt, Freedom ofthe Will and the Concept ofa Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971).
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acts freely as long as she acts on the basis of a desire that suitably "meshes"
with other elements of her psychology, such as her "second-order desires."
A first-order desire takes a particular action as its object, such as drinking
a cup of coffee, whereas a second-order desire is a desire for other desires.
The mesh theorist can explain why agents fail to act freely in certain
paradigmatic cases. Consider for instance an opiate addict who acts on the
basis of an irresistible or pathological impulse to take drugs. The addict
acting on such an impulse may well disavow her behavior; that is to say, she
may wish that she could resist her first-order desire to take drugs. When
there is a sufficiently large breakdown in the hierarchical mesh between the
various desires that constitute a person, as in the case of the extreme addict,
the person fails to act freely on Frankfurt's view.
Note that even if all desires are determined by factors beyond a person's
direct control-factors like genes and environment--this does not preclude the ability to act freely on the mesh theory. Even if human behavior
is fully a product of causally determined neural firings in the brain, as the
reformists suggest, this does not preclude varying degrees of hierarchical
mesh in an agent's psychology. Our desires remain part of the causal chain
that ultimately results in action, and desires can be more or less reflective of
a person's considered judgments about how she ought to act. In other
words, the scientific worldview does not vitiate the kind of capacities "free
agents" are assumed to have on the compatibilist picture. Biological determinism does not erase the distinction between the unwilling and regretful
addict and a person who acts on the basis of a desire she endorses as
reflective of her true self.
In contrast with compatibilist theories of free will, the "libertarian" or
"metaphysically robust" conception of free will holds that a person acts
freely only if she is the "ultimate cause" of her actions, and at the moment
of choice, holding the laws of nature and past events constant, it is true
that she could have done otherwise than what she did.3 6 The libertarian
conception of free will is notoriously hard to pin down, but the idea seems
to be that humans have an internal faculty that enables then to intervene in
the causal flow of the universe as uncaused causal forces. The human self
transcends and operates independently of the determining influence of external factors like genes and environment. Determinism and the scientific
36. See, e.g., GARY WATSON, AGENCY AND ANSWERABILITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 251-53
(z004) (describing the libertarian notion of free will).
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worldview plainly threaten this metaphysically immodest conception of the
human actor. 37
Criminal law scholars critical of the reformist thesis observe that the legal
concept of "free will" is, in fact, compatibilist. They persuasively argue that
substantive legal doctrine does not rely on a metaphysically suspect notion
of free will. For instance, in a series of articles, Stephen Morse has tried to
show that a careful examination of the American criminal code reveals no
metaphysically suspect assumptions: in determining whether an agent
acted "freely," the law considers the actor's general capacity to act on the
basis of her own desires, the actor's capacity to act consistently with her
considered judgments, and the actor's capacity for rational reflection, and
not whether the actor was the ultimate cause of her actions in the metaphysically robust sense-in other words, the law's conception of free
agency is "compatibilist." 38 As Morse puts it:
On rare occasions, a statute might include the phrase [free will]. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (2007) (Consent to sexual activity must be
"pursuant to an exercise of free will."). It is clear, however, that free will in
such instances simply is a proxy for more familiar, less metaphysical criteria,
39
such as the absence of compulsion.
Morse's claims finds further support in the work of Gideon Yaffe. 40 Yaffe

analyzes the Model Penal Code's "voluntary act" requirement "by looking at
the theory of voluntary action popular in 17 th and 18th century Britain
during the period in which the criminal law's voluntary act requirement
became what it is today, a theory disseminated in part through the works
of John Locke."' Locke's notion of a voluntary act is famously compatibilist,

37. Even if the universe is not fully deterministic, so long as human behavior can be
deterministically characterized to a reasonable approximation, there seems to be little room
for libertarian free will. On a related point about "partial indeterminism," see Galen
Strawson, The Impossibility ofMoral Responsibility, 75 PHIL. STUD. 5, 18 (1994).
38. Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding IrrationalNeuroLaw Exuberance: A Pleafor Neuromodesty, 62 MERCER L. REV. 837, 844 (zon1); Morse, Determinism, supra note 3, at 4 n.5
("[Plerusal of any American criminal code or judicial opinions will confirm the absence of
libertarian free will as a genuine criterion."); Morse, Lost in Translation, supra3.
39. Morse, Determinism, supra note 3, at 4 n.5.
40. Yaffe, supra note 3.
41. Id. at 2 ("Has Libet [whose famous studies revealed the unconscious origins of
people's decisions] shown our acts not to be voluntary in the sense that is of relevance to the
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that is, consistent with deterministic science.42 Morse and Yaffe, thus, present compelling reasons to think that criminal law does not rely on a problematic notion of free will in its substantive doctrine.
The theoretical version of the reformist argument invites a similar set of
objections. Recall that Greene and Cohen claimed that retributive theory
presupposes the existence of free will, and that the law will have to change
as retribution loses credibility in the light of modern science. Law scholars
Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson rightly point out that even if Greene
and Cohen are correct in their prediction that people will worry that no one
really deserves to be punished once they accept the scientific worldview,
this hardly entails that the law ought to change in response to people's
worries. 43 As Pardo and Patterson observe, "[I]t is possible for widelyshared intuitions about what is just punishment to be mistaken .... If
neuroscience were to cause a significant shift away [from] retributive intuitions (as they predict) it simply begs the question to assume that this
shift would lead to more just (or more unjust) punishment decisions.""
What makes the above objection especially potent is that there are very
good reasons to think that concerns about the legitimacy of retributive
punishment are likely to be unfounded. Stephen Morse offers a debunking
diagnosis of the tendency to take biological determinism as entailing that
no one deserves punishment. This tendency, he claim, stems from the error
of thinking that "causation of behavior is per se an excusing condition."4 5
The fact that a person's wickedness stems from underlying physical causes
does not render the person any less wicked, or make it unfair to punish him
for his wickedness. There is a long-standing view in moral philosophy
according to which retributive theories of punishment are fully compatible
with the absence of metaphysically robust free will.4 6 In fact, prominent
criminal law theorists have developed retributive theories of punishment
while explicitly endorsing the scientific worldview and a compatibilist

law? The answer to this last question is, given some plausible empirical assumptions,
probably no.").
42. See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING zz6 (Roger
Woolhouse ed., 1998 [1689]) ("[The will in truth, signifies nothing but a power, or ability,
to prefer or choose.").
43. Pardo & Patterson, supra note 3, at 15, 16.
44. Id

45. Morse, Determinism, supra note 3, at
4 6. Id.

18.
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account of free will like Harry Frankfurt's.4 7 It suffices, for present purposes, to note that Greene and Cohen assume, without serious normative
argument, a claim that is highly controversial and finds limited support in
legal philosophy-the claim that the absence of metaphysically robust free
will necessarily renders desert-based retributive theory indefensible. 48
To summarize: conventional arguments for the reformist thesis are
vulnerable to two major objections. First, reformists have failed to convince
that the criminal justice system regards the culpable criminal actor as
having free will in the metaphysically robust sense; reformists have made the
improbable claim that legal doctrine enshrines a problematic conception of
the criminal actor in its positive rules. Second, the claim that retributive
justifications for punishment necessarily presuppose metaphysically robust
free will is a highly controversial, likely wrong, and, at any rate, hard-todefend moral thesis; philosophers have developed retributive theories of

47. For a critique of the idea that no one deserves punishment in a deterministic world,
see MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

504-26 (1997), which develops a retributive theory while embracing determinism and
without relying on metaphysically robust free will. See also Michael Moore, The Determinist
Theory of Excuses, 95 ETHICS 909, 916 (1985).

48. This controversial assumption is especially problematic considering that the development of criminal law was likely influenced by compatibilist moral philosophers. See
generally Kaye, supra note 34. Greene & Cohen do not offer a careful defense of their
position that determinism renders retributive theories of punishment indefensible. Instead,
they urge their audience to reflect on a single thought experiment describing a wrongdoer
programmed to behave badly. Greene & Cohen, supra note i, at 1779-80. They hope that
their thought experiment shows that what Morse calls the "fundamental psycho-legal error"
is "grounded in a powerful moral intuition that the law and allied compatibilist philosophies
try to sweep under the rug." Id. Morse replies: "Green and Cohen are right about ordinary
peoples' intuitions... but people make the fundamental psycho-legal error all the time.
This is a sociological observation and not a justification for thinking causation or determinism does or should excuse behavior.... The lure of purely mechanistic thinking about
behavior when causes are discovered is powerful, but should be resisted." Morse, Determinism, supra note 3, at 19.
Much ink has been spilled on the issue, and it suffices to point out that Greene & Cohen
are unlikely to defeat retributive theory with a single thought experiment. Pardo & Patterson make a similar point: "Greene and Cohen assume that retributivism-and indeed all
moral blame and praise-must be built on a foundation of 'uncaused causation.' But
a retributivist can coherently reject the notion of uncaused causation and still allow for
moral judgments. Even in a world of physical determinism, moral desert may be grounded
in the control people have over their actions through the exercise of their practical rationality." Pardo & Patterson, supra note 3, at 17.
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punishment that require only that criminal wrongdoers have "free will" in
the compatibilist sense in order to be deserving of punishment.

D. The Focus on Doctrine and Theory
The academic debate so far has focused exclusively on whether the doctrinal rules and foundational principles of criminal punishment rely on
problematic assumptions about free will. In fact, even scholars who have
explored the role of free will in criminal law independently of the contemporary debate have concentrated on doctrine and retributive principles. 4 9
This focus of existing scholarship is not entirely surprising. As Justice
Marshall observed in Powell v. State of Tex., "The doctrines of actus reus,
mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between
the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man."5 o Nevertheless, the
next Part recommends a shift in scholarly focus, from doctrine and theory
to the points of moral discretion in the criminal justice system.

49. See, e.g., Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 2245, 2249 (1992) (exploring the criminal law's ideological bias-free
will v. determinism-by studying the law's treatment of "loss of control" defenses and
general excuse theory); James J. Hippard, Unconstitutionalityof CriminalLiability without
Fault:An Argument for a ConstitutionalDoctrine ofMens Rea, so Hous. L. REV. I039, 1043
(1972) (observing that the capacity for free choice is presumed in Anglo-American criminal
law under the rubric of mens rea); Roscoe Pound, The Role ofthe Will in Law, 68 HARv. L.
REV. I (1954) (examining the role of free will in the law and tracing the historical development of Anglo-American legal doctrine from the eighteenth century); Joseph D. Grano,
Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law ofConfessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979) (exploring the
concept of free will as used in the law of confessions); Michael Moore, Causationand the
Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. IOl (1985) (presenting competing theories of punishment and
explaining the excuses as consistent with determinism). For interest in the question outside
of the American context, see, for example, Diana Young, Rationalizing Compassion: Images
of Moral Agency in CriminalLaw, (20o8) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, University of Toronto), which explores the conception of free agency underpinning Canadian criminal law
doctrines of necessity and duress, and Wolfram Kawohl & Elmar Habermeyer, Free Wil:
Reconciling German Civil Law with Libet's NeurophysiologicalStudies on the Readiness Potential, 25 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 309 (2007), which explores the ramifications of Benjamin Libet's
studies of decision making for German law, given its explicit reliance on "free will."
50- 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968).
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II. TOWARD A NEW ACCOUNT OF THE ROLE OF FREE
WILL IN CRIMINAL LAW: DISCRETIONARY ACTORS IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Instead of analyzing the technical notion of free will that underpins legal
doctrine and retributive theory, this Part explores the ways in which a more
ordinary, "folk" understanding of free will influences criminal sentencing.
The first step in this inquiry involves examining the role of discretionary
actors in the criminal justice system. At key points of the sentencing
process, the binding force of doctrinal rules and principles is qualified by
discretion. At such points, actors charged with implementing criminal law
are endowed with the legal authority to make determinations on controlling normative questions outside of the ordinary doctrinal framework. One
such opportunity for discretion occurs at the legislative stage, where elected
representatives determine whether enacted penalties comport with the
principle of proportionality. 5 ' Another opportunity occurs at the sentencing stage of a capital trial, where judges and juries are charged with the task
of determining whether the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors
52
warrant clemency and a sentence less than death.
Analyzing these two instances of discretion reveals that the law grants
unguided discretion to key actors in the sentencing process on important
moral questions and, in doing so, channels folk morality. The discussion
that follows identifies the scope of legislator and juror discretion with
reference to relevant case law, and highlights the irreducibly moral content
of the judgments legislators and jurors are empowered to make. Part II
contributes to the broader debate by exploring an overlooked channel
though which a scientifically suspect conception of human behavior might
influence who and how much we punish. If folk morality is informed by
distorting beliefs about the role and causal significance of free will, then the
law gives legal effect to such distortions via its discretionary scheme.

A. Proportionality as a Legislative Policy Choice
Proportionality in punishment is a well-established goal of criminal law. The
Model Penal Code, for example, aims "to safeguard offenders against
51.See infra Part II.A.
5z.

See infra Part II.B.
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excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary punishment." 5 3 Proportionality,
understood as congruity between the degree of sanction and an offender's
moral guilt, represents a limitation on the state's power to incarcerate or
execute individuals, and applies whether the state punishes to exact retribution, deter, or incapacitate.5 1 Prominent theories of criminal law's justification declare proportionality to be an essential moral precondition on just
punishment, and the principle finds approval in prevailing practice. 5 5
Although courts occasionally review whether sentencing statutes in general, and as applied in particular cases, comport with the principle of
proportionality, the responsibility (and authority) to make proportionality
determinations falls almost entirely on state and federal legislatures. Three
main factors define (and preserve) the scope of this allocation of responsibility: (i) In recent years congress and state legislatures have moved to
limit judges' power in the fashioning of individualized sentences via
mandatory sentencing statutes and sentencing guidelines that are presumptively binding on judges. (2) Courts are highly reluctant to engage
in post facto review of legislative policy choices vis-i-vis the principle of
proportionality. (3) The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution
as deferring almost entirely to the will of the people, as expressed in
legislation, on the moral question of proportionality.
In the 198os, legislatures departed from a model of sentencing that
grants judges full discretion in fashioning individualized penalties.5 " The
previously unchecked power of judges was transferred to legislatures via the
enacting of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes and the promulgation
of guidelines that channel the judge's choice of sentence in individual
§ oz (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
54. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 9 (1968) ("[I]t is perfectly
consistent to assert both that the General Justifying Aim of the practice of punishment is its
beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of this General Aim should be qualified or
restricted out of deference to principles of Distribution which require that punishment
should be only of an offender for an offense."); Alice Ristroph, ProportionalityAs A Principle
of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 265-66 (2005) (observing that proportionality
should be understood as a limitation on the state's power to punish).
55. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (finding a proportionality principle
in the Eighth Amendment). But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991)
(observing that the Eighth Amendment prohibits only sentences "gravely disproportionate"
to the crime committed). See generally Hart, supra note 54.
56 . See Kevin R. Retiz, The Status of Sentencing Guideline Reforms in the U.S., 1o
OVERCROWDED TIMES I, 8-Io (1999) (discussing the transformation in U.S. criminal law).
53.
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cases. 57 For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, although rendered
advisory after U.S. v. Booker, encourage judges to make sentencing decisions
based on specific combinations of offense and offender characteristics and
within a narrow range of recommended sentence58 ; mandatory minimum
statutes, such as California's Three Strike laws, federal antidrug laws, and
laws pertaining to noncontact child pornography offenses, require judges to
impose specified and often strikingly severe penalties whenever offenders fall
within a broadly defined category.5 9 The resulting regime gives unfettered
expression to legislative determinations on how much punishment is appropriate for particular classes of offenders.
Courts have revealed a strong reluctance to second-guess the penalty
determinations of the legislature. Even where penalties have been described
by judges as "savage" and widely disproportionate to the crime, courts have
declined to set the sentence aside. 60 In particular, the Supreme Court has
57. See 18 U.S.C.A § 3553 (West zoo). For nearly twenty years, federal judges were
generally required to impose sentences within the applicable guideline range. This system
changed in 2005, when, in U.S. v. Booker, the Supreme Court rendered the guidelines
advisory. 543 U.S. 224, 264 ("The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines,
must... take them into account when sentencing.").
58. In zoo5, five states had guidelines that were presumptively binding on judges;
another eight states had guidelines that either had advisory force or were purely voluntary.
See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 788-94 (200).
59. See, e.g., State v. Berger, 134 P-3 d 378 (Ariz. 2oo6) (upholding a mandatory sentence
of zoo years imprisonment without possibility of parole imposed on a first-offender for
possession of twenty images of child pornography that he downloaded from the internet);
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (20o6) (describing penalties under the Armed Career Criminal Act).
On states with mandatory minimums, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory
Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 201-07 (1993), which discusses state and
Congressional enactment of severe mandatory minimums for drug offenses in the
1980s, and CAL. DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, PROSECUTORS' PERSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA S
THREE STRIKES LAW: A 10-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 17 (2004), which observes that between
1994 and 2004, 7,332 defendants were given sentences of twenty-five years to life under
California's Three Strikes Law. On federal mandatory minimums, see U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM

PENALTIES IN THE

App. A (zon1), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative
andPublicAffairs/CongressionalTestimony-andReports/Mandatory-Minimum
Penalties/zomo3i RtCMandatoryMinimum.cfm.
6o. In U.S. v. Jackson, Judge Posner, in his concurrence, described the sentence of life
without parole, imposed on a defendant who attempted a bank robbery the same day he was
released from incarceration for previous robberies, as "savage" and noted: "I think the
sentence Jackson received is too harsh and I think it appropriate to point this out even
though he presents no ground on which we are authorized to set aside an excessively severe
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
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been willing to uphold virtually any sentence of imprisonment without
engaging in substantive proportionality review, even sentences that appear
strikingly draconian and disproportionate. 6'
Reasons for the rarity of successful challenges to the proportionality of
enacted sentences can be found in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
the Eighth Amendment. Although the "cruel and unusual" clause has been
interpreted as requiring that penalties be proportionate to offenses, the
Supreme Court has held that "it forbids only extreme sentences that are
grossly disproportionate to the crime."62 In Atkins v. Virginia, Justice
Kennedy articulated the rationale for such an attenuated understanding
of the scope of the Eighth Amendment; Kennedy observed that "the
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency of society .... [The] clearest and most reliable objective evidence

ofcontemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."63
The Court referred approvingly to "our tradition of deferring to state
legislatures in making and implementing such important policy decisions"
as the proportionality of penalties,6 4 and advised caution against judges
imposing their "subjective values" on the subject of proportionality.6 5

sentence... [Does] the sheer enormity of his conduct warrant[] imprisonment for the rest
of his life as a matter of retributive justice[?] It does not. Few murderers, traitors, or rapists
are punished so severely...." 835 F2d "95, 1198-89 (1987).
61. For example, in Ewing v. California the Court upheld a sentence of life for
a defendant who tried to steal three golf clubs while on parole from a nine-year prison term,
538 U.S. n1(2003); in Lockyer v. Andrade a sentence of fifty years to life for a recidivist who
shoplifted videotapes valued under $200, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); and in Rummel v. Estelle a life
term for a defendant whose third offense was obtaining $121 by false pretense, and whose
two prior offense were passing a forged check worth $28 and fraudulent use of a credit card
to obtain $8o worth of goods, 445 U.S. 263 (5980). In Lockyer, Justice Souter for the four
dissenters noted, "if Andrade's sentence is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no
meaning." 538 U.S. at 83. See generally John F. Stinneford, Rethinking ProportionalityUnder
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 V^. L. REV. 899 (ZOII).
62. Harmelin, 5o U.S. at 959.
63. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,311-12 (zooz) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
64. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24, 27-28 ("Though three strike laws may be relatively new, our
tradition of deferring to state legislatures in making and implementing such important
policy decisions is longstanding.... Critics have doubted the law's wisdom . .. [but] we do
not sit as a superlegislature to second-guess these policy choices.").
65. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986 ("The real function of a constitutional proportionality
principle, if it exists, is to enable judges to evaluate a penalty that some assemblage of men
and women has considered proportionate-and to say that it is not. For that real-world
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The court's deference to the legislature results in penalties determined
by popular morality. Under the current discretionary scheme, proportionality determinations reflect either the personal moral convictions of legislators or-what seems more likely-the convictions and penal demands of
the general public. Legislators, subject to the forces of mass democratic
politics, likely channel the penal demands and moral intuitions of their
constituents."6 Evidence to be introduced later suggests that popular convictions regarding fairness and proportionality in sentencing are strongly
influenced by a scientifically suspect "free will" based conception of criminal
agency.
B. Democratized Death Sentencing
The death penalty context provides another example of the way in which
popular morality drives criminal law. In a series of cases since Gregg v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court has developed a jurisprudence that stresses
democratically administered and individualized justice in capital cases; the
court requires a sentence of death to reflect the unique circumstances of the
defendant (individualization), and delegates the necessarily moral task of
determining whether death as opposed to clemency is warranted in a particular case to the sentencing agent-in many cases, the jury (democratization).67 What results is a sentencing scheme that commits to the discretion of
the sentencing agent a complex moral question: Is the imposition of death
a more appropriate moral response than clemency, given the defendant's
background, character, and crime?

enterprise, the standards seem so inadequate that the proportionality principle becomes an
invitation to imposition of subjective values.").
66. SeeJAMES

Q. WHITMAN,

HARSH JUSTICE 199 (2003) (citing a variety of sources to

defend the view that American harshness as driven by the penal demands of the general
public); seegenerally Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government,and the Decline
ofExpertAuthority: Some Reflections on "Three Strikes" in California,28 PAC. L.J. 243 (1996).
67. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding Georgia's capital sentencing scheme constitutional). On
the role of the jury in capital trials, see Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-DiferentJurisprudence
and the Role of the CapitalJury, 2 OHIo ST. CRIM. L.J. 117, 148 (2004) (describing states
that have jury determination of all aspects of capital fact-finding, and states in which juries
are purely advisory); Bryan A. Stevenson, The UltimateAuthority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the jury in Capital Sentencing, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1091 (2003)
(discussing the importance of the jury in capital trials).

472

|

NEW

CRIMINAL LAW

REVIEW

VOL.

16 1 NO.

3 | SUMMER

2013

The current capital sentencing scheme in most states has emerged from
the requirements articulated in Gregg." In that case, the Supreme Court
famously held that a capital sentencing scheme must allow the sentencing
agent, whether judge or jury, to take into account the character and record
of the defendant. Today all death penalty states require, with minor variations, three connected findings before a death sentence becomes lawful:
a determination of "aggravating factors," a determination of "mitigating
factors," and a balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.69 The death
penalty is lawful only if the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors. In many instances, the responsibility for all three determinations
falls squarely on the jury.70
The Court has held that the question of what counts as a mitigating
factor must not be constrained by law. In Locket v. Ohio, the court announced that the legislature must leave unrestricted the category of mitigating factors.71 The Court insisted that any factor that might call for
a lesser penalty, relating to the defendant's background and character or
to the circumstances of the offense, can count as a mitigating factor.
Additionally, the Court held in Buchanan v. Angelone that the Constitution
imposes no affirmative obligation on judges or legislatures to instruct the
capital jury on mitigating factors, and that no definitional instruction need
be given on any particular statutory mitigating factor. 72 As a result, the
Court has effectively committed the question of what counts as a mitigating
factor to the unfettered discretion of the sentencing body. 73

68. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189-96.
69. Abramson, supra note 67, at 153.
70. Id. at 148.
7. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that "the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense" that the defendant might proffer).
72. 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998).
73. McGautha v. California, 402 US 183, 207 (1971) rehg granted judgment vacated sub
nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972) ("[W]e find it quite impossible to say that
committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death
is offensive to anything in the Constitution."). For an example of jury instructions on
mitigation, see Cal. Jury Instr. Crim. 8.88 (Spring zoo), "A mitigating circumstance is any
fact, condition or event which does not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in
question, but may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the
appropriateness of the death penalty."
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The Court has emphasized that the sentencing body in capital trials is
charged with a necessarily moral task. In Spaziano v. Florida,Justice Stevens observed that the death sentence "is the one punishment that cannot
be prescribed by a rule of law as judges normally understand such rules,"
but is instead an ethicaljudgment expressing the conscience of the community regarding whether an "individual has lost his moral entitlement to
live," and in the "final analysis, capital punishment rests on not a legal but
an ethical judgment-an assessment of... the moral guilt of the
defendant."74

The important role played by the capital jury, given the ethical content
of its decisions, presents a compelling example of the way sentencing
determinations are driven by discretionary moral adjudication informed
by popular will. The criminal justice system defers on a controlling moral
question to the sentencing body; mitigating factors can make the difference
in a death penalty case. A death verdict might turn on whether the jury
regards, for example, the offender's history of beatings by a harsh father and
emotional disturbance since early childhood as a mitigating factor.7 The
evidence to be introduced later reveals that the way in which jurors respond
to such facts about an offender's history is influenced by their beliefs about
free will.
C. Folk Morality in the Legal System
The features of the criminal justice system that have been highlighted bear
significantly on the reformist debate. As the examples of legislative discretion in the fashioning of proportionate sentencing statutes and juror discretion in capital trials reveal, the criminal justice system is structured so
that it defers to popular will on key moral questions-the answers to which
have dramatic consequences for defendants. Numerous scholars have
argued that this discretionary scheme has produced an overly draconian
regime of criminal sentencing. 76 The discussion to follow draws attention
to the ways in which popular beliefs about free will could be biasing
74. 465 U.S. 447, 468-89, 481 (1984) (Stevens J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis added).
75. For similar facts in a capital trial, see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
76. See WHITMAN, supranote 66; Zimring, supra note 66; Jacob Sullum, 20 Years Later,
Mandatory Minimum Sentences Are Still Mindlessly Draconian, reason.com, http://reason.
com/blog/zon/i/i8/20-years-later-mandatory-minimum-sentenc.
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sentencing actors toward overly harsh and unfair penalties. If folk theories
of moral responsibility and punishment are distorted by a scientifically
suspect view of criminal behavior, then the criminal law gives legal effect
to this bias via its discretionary scheme.

III. THE FOLK PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND
FREE WILL
Having highlighted the role of discretionary moral judgment in the criminal justice system, this article defends the claim that people, generally, have
a libertarian or metaphysically robust conception of free will that distorts
their view of criminal behavior. The reported findings have not been discussed in the existing literature on the reformist critique of criminal law.
These findings show that those who have a strong belief in free will are
inclined to support harsher penalties for criminals, and tend to unreasonably discount such underlying causes of crime as social deprivation and
genetically impaired impulse control. The discussion refers to this phenomenon as the "free will effect."
A. The Folk Understanding of Human Freedom
Empirically minded philosophers and cognitive scientists have only
recently begun investigating, via systematic experimental studies, the contours of the commonsense "folk" notion of freedom. Studies have found
that people are vastly more likely to describe our universe as indeterministic
rather than deterministic, 77 and are inclined to think that a person cannot
act freely if all our actions are determined by prior causes. For instance, in
a study by Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely, and Thomas Nadelhoffer, subjects were given descriptions of a deterministic universe (where everything
that happens is fully determined by the initial state of the universe and
natural laws) and asked whether a criminal wrongdoer in such a universe
commits a wrongful act (sexually assaulting a stranger, cheating on taxes) of
77. Shaun Nichols, Folk Intuitions about Free Will, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 57,
65-67 (20o6) (reviewing studies that suggest that people tend to think that the world is not
deterministic, and human choices are not determined by external causes). Nichols points to
studies that indicate that in some contexts people tend to revert to a deterministic conception of human behavior.
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his own free will. 78 They found that a significant majority of respondents
believed acting freely to be incompatible with a deterministic world.79
A recent study by Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe offers similar
evidence that people regard human choices as exceptional and undetermined by prior causes." Nichols and Knobe made participants read
a vignette that described a person, all of whose desires and thoughts (both
conscious and unconscious) direct him against a particular action. Participants also read a symmetric vignette that substituted the person with
a computer, and the desires and thoughts with computer programming.
Subjects were asked whether the person/computer might engage in the act
despite the contrary desires/software; "Participants tended to say that the
computer could not possibly move its hand if all its software tells it to do
otherwise but that John actually could move his hand even ifall ofhis desires
and thoughts told him to do otherwise... the difference between the cases
was statistically significant."" Nichols and Knobe propose a suggestive
theory to explain the results of their studies. They claim that the "results
suggest that people's ordinary understanding of human action is importantly different from the picture one finds in cognitive science."82 In
contrast with the scientific picture, which accounts for behavior wholly
in terms of determined mental states and processes, "people's ordinary
understanding appears to involve something more-a separate self that
stands outside all these states and processes and can choose to ignore their
promptings." 83
It suffices for present purposes to take cautious note of the findings.
Whereas some scholars have argued that subjects in the studies are simply
confused about their own concept of free will, 8 subsequent studies have
78. Adam Feltz, Edward T Cokely, & Thomas Nadelhoffer, Natural Compatibilism
MIND & LANGUACE I, 11-13
(2009) ("The difference between matched compatibilist and incompatibilist responses was
statistically significant [62% incompatibilist, 29% compatibilist].... In our studies, most
participants expressed incompatibilist intuitions about free will.").

versus NaturalIncompatibilism:Back to the DrawingBoard,24

79. Id
8o. Shuan Nichols & Joshua Knobe, Free Will and the Bounds of the Self in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 530 (Robert Kane ed., 2011).

81. Id. at 551. The difference between the cases was statistically significant (t(42) = 7.06,
p < .ooi). Id. at 554 n.Io.
82. Id. at 55.
83. Id
84. Id. at 533 (discussing opposing interpretations of the experimental findings).
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tried to account for the concerns raised, and the findings seem robust.8 5
Although folk intuitions may not be monolithic, in many cases people clearly
do at least perceive free will as being incompatible with a deterministic
worldview. In combination with the evidence to follow, the results support
the view that belief in metaphysically robust free will has an important role to
play at least in the context of criminal punishment.
B. Free Will, the Fundamental Attribution Error, and the Effect on
Punitive Impulses
There is well-documented evidence that people tend to ignore the biosocial
causes of crime. Individuals are prone to commit what psychologists have
termed the "fundamental attribution error"-providing causal explanations for the behavior of others in largely dispositional terms ("originating
from the person's character") as opposed to situational terms ("originating
from the person's context").8 Criminological and psychological research
since the 195os has shown that individuals are especially prone to underemphasize the role of situational factors in the context of crime and punishment.17 The attitudes of the general public with respect to the causes of
crime are in sharp contrast with the views of mental health experts and
scientists. 8 8 Moreover, those who view crime as mostly caused by deeply
85. Id. at 533 (observing that subsequent studies have accounted for the worries and
shown them to be red herrings). See also Feltz, Cokley, & Nadelhoffer, supra note 78, at 8
("[Tihere may be discrete groups of people who have different concepts of free will....").
86. For a review of the evidence, see Shadd Maruna & Anna King, Once a Criminal,
Always a Criminal?:'Redeemability'and
the Psychology of Punitive PublicAttitudes, 1yEUR. J.
CRIM. POL'Y REs. 7, 8 (2009). Maruna & King observe: "When we see others behaving in
negative ways, we tend to systematically underestimate the influence of environment and
assume that this is the 'type' of people they are. This bias, then, has implications for our
social attitudes and behaviors. Indeed, an expansive body of research has found that these
causal attributions are consistently implicated in a surprising array of behavioral dynamics."
Id. (citations omitted).
87. Id. (reviewing several studies that suggest that individuals are prone to underemphasize the role of situational factors in crime).
88. See Andrew E. Lelling, A Psychological Critiqueof Character-BasedTheories of Criminal Excuse, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 35, 86-87 (1998) ("Trait psychologists and situationists
continue to debate the point, but by now there is general agreement within the field that
... stable internal dispositions affecting behavior across different situations, do exist...
[but] play a far smaller role in human behavior than generally believed."); Mark Cunningham, Special Issues in CapitalSentencing, 2 Apr. PSYCH. CRIM. JUSTICE 205, 208-09
(2006) ("In the mental health sciences, there is a bedrock assumption that choices and
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rooted character traits that are not shaped or influenced by biological, neuropsychological, environmental, and other situational factors, are regularly
found to be more punitive than those who view crime as a manifestation
of social and biological conditions: "This correlation has been confirmed in
both quantitative and qualitative studies of public opinion with samples
ranging from university students to probation officers and judges to nationally representative public samples." 89
The tendency to ignore the underlying biosocial causes of crime seems
associated with a strong commitment to free will and appears to influence
attitudes toward punishment. For example, in a recent study by C.E. Tygart,
8oo adult respondents, randomly chosen from California, were asked to
select one of five categories concerning their position on the death penalty90 ; respondents were made to consider crimes where the death penalty
could result and were subsequently asked to indicate on a sliding scale the
degree to which they thought a criminal's act resulted from an exercise of
free will as opposed to being "determined by such things as problems
within a society or a poor social environment."9 ' Tygart observed that 32
percent of the respondents thought that criminal acts were entirely the result
offree will as opposed to situational factors, and the mean response attributed 76 percent of the causal responsibility to free will. 92 Moreover,
"greater free will attribution was associated with a statistically significant
93
increase in the support for capital punishment."
behavior are shaped and influenced by biological, developmental, cognitive,... and situational factors. . .. The interaction and convergence of these factors has been postulated as
a primary cause of criminal violence ..... ).
89. Maruna & King, supra note 86, at 8 (discussing the supporting studies).
90. C. E. Tygart, Respondents' 'Free Will' View of Criminal Behavior and Support for
Capital Punishment, 6 INT'L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 371, 372 (1994). The five categories
were: (I) opposition to the death penalty; (2) approval but wanted the penalty used less than
currently; () supported death penalty at current levels of executions; (4) advocated increase
of executions from current level; and (5) advocated substantial increase of executions from
current levels.
91. Id. ("Respondents were given ten alternatives of percentages of the behavior due to
free will, ranging from 'all' to 'none', with intervals of 1o percent.").
92.

Id. at 373.

.59, p < o.oo). The worry might be
raised that the survey was badly phrased, given that it prevented subjects from responding
that criminal behavior is both 100 percent a result of free will and too percent a result of
background factors; "compatibilists" would respond in this way, given that in their view,
acts can be freely chosen as well as determined by external factors. However, this is not likely
93. Id The results were statistically significant (r -
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Further evidence of a possible interaction between belief in free will and
the attribution error, and a resulting effect on attitudes toward punishment,
can be found in the capital jury context. Data gathered from capital juror
interviews illuminates the process by which jurors reach their final sentencing
decisions. Scott Sundby reports the following findings based on 165 juror
interviews from 41 cases: less than half of jurors interviewed claim to be
incorporating mitigating circumstances into the final sentence recommendation 94; jurors who vote death are especially unreceptive to mitigating
evidence and tend to have a strong belief in free will 9 5 ; jurors who deemphasize situational causes of crime strongly voice the view that the murderer
acted of his own free will and could have chosen to be a decent person.
These attitudes amongst jurors prevail even when the defense has introduced
substantial evidence of the effect of adverse circumstances on the offender's
behavior.9 7 Similar findings have been reported by other researchers."

to have been a problem if we can trust the evidence in Part IlIl.A, which suggests that the
commonly accepted notion of free will is not compatibilist. At any rate, it remains striking
that those who preferred to describe criminal behavior as freely chosen were revealed to be
harsher.
94. SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH
PENALTY zo8 n.4 (2005) (referring to studies that find that less than half of tested jurors are
able to identify existing mitigating circumstances, and observing that the ability to identify
mitigating circumstance makes a decisive difference in sentencing).
95. Sundby identifies a type of influential juror that he describes as "'fundamentalist' in
his belief that "certain types of murder morally require a sentence of death... almost to the
exclusion of all other factors." Id. at 25. He observes that: "Fundamentalists as a whole also
tend to be strongly unreceptive to any explanation of a defendant's actions based on his or
her life's events. Although a defendant may have called a number of witnesses, taking days
and sometimes weeks to put on a case in mitigation, many fundamentalists had great
difficulty even remembering what the defense had argued in favor of a life sentence." Id.
96. Id. at iz5-30.
97. Id
98. See Mona Lynch, The Social Psychology of Capital Cases, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE
COURTROOM l57, 167 (Joel D. Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss eds., 2009) ("[M]itigating
evidence plays a disturbingly minor role in jurors' deliberation."); John H. Blume, Sheri
Lynn Johnson, & Scott E. Sundby, Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of
Knowing WhatJurors Tell Us About Mitigation,36HOFSTRA L. REV. I035, Io6I (2008) ("[A]
consistent theme in many penalty phase deliberations is whether, despite the facts in
mitigation, the defendant could still have exercised his "free will."). See also James LuginbukI & Julie Howe, Discretion in CapitalSentencing Instructions. Guided or Misguided?,
70 IND. L.J. n61, 118o (1995); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionariesand Death: Do Capital
Jurors UnderstandMitigation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. I (1995); Abramson, supra note 67.
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Not surprisingly, people's tendency to underemphasize the role of situational factors in crime is exploited by prosecutors. 99 In the death penalty
context, "the state almost never endorses the defense's view that interacting
adverse biopsychosocial factors were integral to the defendant's capital conduct."' 00 Instead, the prosecution emphasizes the defendant's free choice,
"[often] asserting that a defendant's crime stems entirely from his evil
makeup and that he therefore deserves to be judged and punished exclusively
01
on the basis of his presumably free, morally blameworthy choices."
The link between an emphasis on free will to the exclusion of other
factors and support for harsher sentences has been observed more generally."o2 Studies have found "that those who believe criminal acts are the
result of freely chosen and willful behavior are more likely to be punitive
than those who feel crime is the result of external circumstances and

99. Craig Haney, Violence and the CapitalJury-Mechanisms ofMoralDisengagementand
the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN L. REV. 1447, 1459 (1997). Haney observes that
"[T]he prosecution's implicit.. . 'theory' of the typical capital case generally comports with
the jurors' stereotypical beliefs about crime and punishment. The notion that a defendant's
crime stems entirely from his evil makeup and that he therefore deserves to be judged and
punished exclusively on the basis of his presumably free, morally blameworthy choices is
rooted in a longstanding cultural ethos that capital jurors (like most citizens) have been
conditioned to accept uncritically. Add to this the well-documented tendency of most
people to commit ... the 'fundamental attribution error' . .. .As a result, the typical juror's
preexisting framework for understanding behavior is highly compatible with the basic terms
of the typical prosecutorial narrative." Id. Note that although the scholarship on capital jury
trials might make passing reference to the fact that that jurors emphasize a wrongdoer's free
will, commentators have not inferred from the data that folk beliefs about human agency
systematically influence criminal sentencing.
1oo. Cunningham, supra note 88, at 209.
iox. Haney, supra note 99.
102. See Maruna & King supra note 86, at 7; Sandra D. Haynes, Don Rojas, & Wayne
Viney, Free Will, Determinism, and Punishment, 93 PSYCHOL. REP. 1013 (2003). An issue
that has not been carefully explored here but is worth reflecting on is the manner in which
the rhetoric of free will is used to marshal political resistance to policies that emphasize the
social and biological causes of criminal behavior; "tough-on-crime" politicians get elected
on vocally libertarian platforms that charge criminologists with insufficiently recognizing
our independent moral agency and our ability to rise above our circumstances. See, for
example, Samuel Scheffler's insightful analysis of the conservative attack on a range of liberal
policies in the 1980s. Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism, 21 PHIL. & POL. 299
(1992). Sheffler suggest that conservatives tapped into a dissatisfaction that cut across party
lines with the "attenuated" naturalistic notions of human agency apparent in liberal attitudes toward, among other things, criminal justice. Id.
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constraints." 10 3 In a recent study by Sandra D. Haynes, Don Rojas, and
Wayne Viney, for example, "[d]eterminists were compared with [those
who believe in free will] with respect to philosophy of punishment. Data
provided support for the contention that determinists are less punitive." 0 4
C. Punitive Harshness Driven by a Distorted Conception of
Criminal Agency
To summarize, the studies reveal a number of striking facts about folk
theories of human behavior and attitudes toward punishment. The ordinary,
folk concept of free will seems libertarian or "metaphysically robust" and in
tension with a deterministic understanding of human behavior. Subjects have
a tendency to ignore the situational causes of crime, and an emphasis on free
will to the exclusion of situational factors is correlated with punitive harshness. One possibility is that those who are strongly committed to the existence
of free will and punish more harshly are making a moral mistake when they
fail to consider the contextual causes of criminal behavior. The discussion to
follow supports this possibility by situating the free will effect in moral theory.

IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR PUNISHMENT AND THE
MORAL INFERENCES BLOCKED BY A DISTORTED
CONCEPTION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
This Part examines the free will effect through a moral lens. It argues that
an exaggerated belief in free will makes sentencing actors harsher because it
makes them less likely to attend to moral considerations that would otherwise restrain their punitive impulses. The relevant moral considerations
derive from arguments for mitigation that appeal to the role of contextual
factors in causing crime. In other words, it would be morally desirable for
individuals to view free will as a less significant causal driver of behavior,
because this would make them more attentive to the underlying causes of
crime, which would in turn foster a greater sensitivity to moral arguments
for punitive restraint. The discussion begins with an account of why factors
like social deprivation and mental defect mitigate how much punishment
a criminal deserves when they causally influence behavior. The discussion
io3. Maruna & King, supra note 86, at 7.
104. Haynes, Rojas, & Viney, supra note 102.
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ends with an explanation of why belief in free will makes individuals ignore
the underlying causes of crime.

A. Why Being Attentive to the Underlying Causes of Criminal
Behavior is Morally Important
The argument developed here relies on moral intuitions that are widely
shared and relatively uncontroversial to show that underestimating the
degree to which criminal behavior is determined by situational factors leads
to biased moral judgments about sentencing. When we fail to attend to the
criminogenic effects of such factors as social deprivation and mental defect,
we end up being insensitive to arguments for mitigation that appeal to the
role of such factors in causing bad behavior. Indeed, it should come as no
surprise that sound ethical thinking requires thinking realistically about
human psychology. 1o5 Nevertheless, it takes some work to specify precisely
what it is, morally speaking, that we miss when we make unrealistic assumptions about the agential capacities of our peers.
A point of clarification leads directly into the substantive argument. As
noted previously, scholars writing on the normative significance of deterministic science tend to embrace a view called "compatibilism." Compatibilists think that we can come to deserve blame and punishment even if
our actions are fully determined by forces external to us; a retributive
penological scheme survives the truth of determinism intact. In contrast,
"incompatibilists" insist that our actions must be undeterminedin order to
serve as a legitimate basis for holding each other morally responsible. In the
incompatibilist's view, finding out that genetics and social upbringing
substantially influence human behavior is morally significant because it
tends to show that agents lack "ultimate control" over their actions. Indeed,
traditional reformists like Greene and Cohen have explicitly relied on
incompatibilist assumptions to make their revisionist point about the new
science. The moral argument advanced here does not depend on the controversial incompatibilist assumption that to deserve punishment, it must
1o. Even those who think that moral judgments are irreconcilably relative to each
person's unique point of view acknowledge the possibility of moral improvement relative to
those subjective standards. That is to say, it remains possible on even a subjectivist
understanding of morality to persuade others-on their own terms-that their moral views
are possibly mistaken. One way to do this is to point out where moral judgments are based
on false empirical beliefs. The argument presented here proceeds along these lines.
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be true that the criminal had a kind of control over his actions that he lacks in
a deterministic world. On the view developed here, the fact that external
factors causally influence human behavior does not per se mitigate or excuse
criminal offenders. What the view relies on is merely the observation that the
causal influence of certain kinds of external factors on an individual's propensity to act criminally, given the unique way in which those factors influence behavior, mitigates how much punishment the individual deserves.
Although many factors can causally contribute to an agent's propensity
to behave badly-including mental handicaps, lack of education (including
moral education), extremely deprived socioeconomic conditions, and
a genetic predisposition toward aggressive behavior-certain kinds of criminogenic factors uniquely mitigate how much punishment a wrongdoer
deserves, and not because they vitiate the agent's "ultimate control" over
his actions. Contrast, for instance, a criminal who grew up in a singleparent household, was extremely neglected as a child, and suffered from
poverty and extreme social deprivation, with one who grew up in a stable
and financially secure household but happens to be genetically predisposed
to malicious and extreme self-regarding behavior. The marginalized wrongdoer, insofar as his circumstances disposed him toward crime, has a claim
against society that bears on his punitive treatment that the other does not.
In particular, the marginalized criminal did not benefit from the basic
conditions for human flourishing-conditions that each of us deservesand this fact bears on his desert for criminal conduct. It bears on his desert
because our collective failure to afford him better opportunities in life
causally contributed to his wrongful behavior (per our assumption). Perhaps we could have prevented his criminal conduct by addressing the real
and remediable harms of poverty and inequality. In other words, we might
have prevented his crimes by discharging our independent moral obligations owed to him. The marginalized criminal's situation invites us to
consider the possibility that we are, to some degree, complicit in his crime
and deserve blame for being part of a society that chooses to leave a significant portion of its own behind.
The moral principle that motivates this line of thinking is that our
standing to punish wrongdoers depends on our having invested in measures
to help people avoidpunishment.'o6 Where society has some shared control
1o6. Other writers have made similar points about the relationship between communal
standing to blame and collective responsibility for failing to rectify social harms. See Mari
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over a criminogenic factor, societal obligations obtain to alleviate the effects
of that factor. Social deprivation is an obvious example of a criminogenic
factor over which we have some control.' Given the plausible assumption
that we have a collective moral duty to maintain a decent quality of life for
the least well-off, our failure to fulfill that duty, insofar as it perpetuates
criminality, undermines our moral standing to punish criminals with underprivileged backgrounds. The failure entails that we did not do enough to help
the underprivileged avoid a life of crime and the violence of the state. 0 8
The argument above is not meant to altogether deny the individual
moral responsibility of criminal offenders who come from deprived backgrounds. An impoverished background does not excuse antisocial conduct
or earn one the right to inflict suffering on others. The need to incapacitate
and deter offenders will continue to count in favor of punishing criminals
who come from poor backgrounds, their unfortunate and pitiable circumstances notwithstanding. Nevertheless, there is scope for mitigation in our
punitive attitudes toward marginalized offenders, at least relative to other
Matsuda, On Causation, too COLUMBIA L. REV. 2195 (2ooo); George Wright, The Progressive Logic of CriminalResponsibility andthe Circumstancesofthe Most Deprived,43 CATH.
U. L. REV. 459 (1994) (arguing that when it fails to make allowances for dire economic and
social circumstances in punishment, the criminal law departs from the principle that
punishment should track moral guilt); David L. Bazelon, The Morality ofthe CriminalLaw,
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 389 (1976) (describing cases that illustrate the way in which situational factors like social deprivation and mental defect reduce the offender's moral culpability, and observing that these factors are under-recognized in American sentencing);
THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE To EACH OTHER 256-67 (1999) (arguing that the
moral justification for punishing wrongdoers depends on our ensuring adequate opportunities to avoid punishment).
107. See e.g., Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background'" Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe EnvironmentalDeprivation?,3 LAW & INEQUALITY 9 23-34
(1985) (summarizing scientific evidence on the role of environmental deprivation in criminal
behavior); DEIDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTION, CRIME
PREVENTION, AND THE LAW 155 (2005) (describing the broad agreement among criminologists that social factors such as income inequality and poverty contribute to crime).
io8. It bears emphasizing that such arguments for mitigation as discussed here do not
depend on the assumption that the marginalized defendant lacks "ultimate control" over
his actions. Even the wrongdoer who is genetically predisposed toward malicious conduct
lacks ultimate control over his actions. However, unlike the marginalized defendant, the
person genetically predisposed to malice may well have had many fulfilling opportunities
in life. He does not appear to have a valid complaint against society. What could we have
done in his case? What plausible complaint could he have regarding the way society has
generally treated him?
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classes of offenders. It is worth recalling that our penal codes punish in the
service of more than only utilitarian aims. Some degree of punishment
tracks just deserts over and above what is strictly necessary to serve consequentialist goals. The recognition that in certain cases economic deprivation and our failure to remedy it had a substantial role to play in causing
bad behavior will attenuate, at least to some degree, the retributive element
in punishment.' 0 9 (Some deterrence-based considerations for punishment
may also be undermined when deterministic reflection forces us to recognize that there are other ways of preventing wrongful behavior-for
instance, fostering better opportunities for individuals to sustain a satisfactory life within the bounds of the law.)
Morally distinguishing, in this way, social deprivation from other factors
that causally influence crime may suggest a basis for an objection. Some
might hold that much like those who are, say, genetically predisposed to
malicious behavior, the poor cannot validly complain when they are enthusiastically punished for their crimes because society has done more than
enough to help the economically deprived avoid punishment. The point,
however, is not specific to the example of social deprivation. Undoubtedly,
there will be cases where our collective failure to minimize the effects of
some criminogenic factor will bear on how much we can justly punish. In
a different case it may not be social deprivation but a congenital (yet
treatable) mental disorder that underscores our failure to provide psychological assistance and other rehabilitative services to the vulnerable. The
crucial point is that we need to be able to appreciate, whenever it is true,
that (a) an identifiable criminogenic factor causally contributed to an individual's criminal propensities, and that (b) we should have done more to
minimize that factor's influence."o We will be less prone to acting violently against the disadvantaged criminal, when we realize that we failed to
remedy the disadvantages that made him a criminal. Recognition of our
collective moral failures stays the hand of vengeance.

109. Such mitigation "allows us to record the defendant's complicity in her own plight
and, at the same time, do at least some justice to the special dificulties under which she
labors." WATSON, supra note 36.
no. Of course, (b) may or may not be true in any given case. Whether it is will
undoubtedly depend on a whole host of moral considerations of the sort that ground
collective social obligations generally. The relevant considerations need not be explicated to
allow an appreciation of the thrust of the argument being presented here.
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Where the influence of criminogenic factors is morally significant, it bears
on how much punishment is appropriate for affected offenders and is, thus,
directly implicated in questions of proportionality and mitigation. Retributive proportionality involves a correspondence between the degree of sanction and an individual's desert based on his offense and circumstances."'
Recall that the moral-jurisprudential principle commanding retributive proportionality enjoys widespread support in practice and in theory." 2 The
principle restricts how much the state can justly punish criminals.' 13It
commands the sanction-setting authority to limit punishment to what is
deserved and morally appropriate. Similarly, the duty to mitigate requires the
sentencing agent to be sensitive to the unique circumstances of an offender
that arouse sympathy and militate in favor of clemency.' 1 4
In. On this point see Ristroph, supra note 54; and Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the
Penalty Phase, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. H95, 1203 (2000), which observes that "[tihe [relevant]
question is only whether, roughly speaking, the punishment imposed is accurate with
respect to the person's desert."
H2. See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: "Proportionality"Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 57I, 646 (2005)
("Limiting retributivism is a sound jurisprudential principle which enjoys widespread
support, and the Supreme Court has used this principle to place constitutional limits on the
imposition of capital punishment, fines and forfeitures, and punitive damages.").
n3. For an example of a court applying the logic of retributive proportionality as
a constraint on how much the state can punish, see U.S. v. Bajakajian,524 U.S. 321,334-40
(1998), where the Court observed that offense gravity should be measured relative to the
degree of harm done and the offender's culpability. See also Wright, supra note io6 (arguing
that when it fails to make allowances for dire economic and social circumstances in punishment, the criminal law departs from the principle that punishment should track moral
guilt).
14. The concurrence in U.S. v. Moore observed that although such factors as "weakness
of intellect," "mental defect," and addiction do not excuse defendants or deprive them of
criminal responsibility, rather, what it is "feasible to do" with situational factors and general
disabilities of self-control "is to accord them proper weight in sentencing." 486 F.2d 1139,
n8o (D.C. Cir. 1973). Additionally, the Model Penal Code recognizes, in its discussion of
the provocation defense, that features of a wrongdoer's situation can reduce his blameworthiness and how much punishment he deserves; notably, it leaves the ultimate determination regarding which factors reduce blameworthiness to the "ordinary citizen": "It is clear
that personal handicaps and some external circumstances must be taken into account ....
[I]t would be morally obtuse to appraise a crime for mitigation of punishment without
reference to these factors .... In the end, the question is whether the actor's loss of selfcontrol can be understood in terms that arousesympathy in the ordinarycitizen. Section 210.3
... leaves the ultimate judgment to the ordinary citizen in the function of juror assigned to
resolve the specific case." Model Penal Code § 210.3 cmt. 63 (1980) (emphasis added).
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A failure to attend to the role of criminogenic factors like social deprivation in criminal behavior therefore results in a failure to ensure justice in
punishment." 5 There are compelling arguments for mitigation that appeal
to the role of criminogenic factors in causing bad behavior, and individuals
will fail to see the force of such arguments if they happen to be biased
against evidence of contextual determinacy. The studies previously discussed provide strong reasons to think that an exaggerated belief in free
will results in such a bias. The next Subpart elaborates on the reasons why
belief in free will makes individuals unfairly resistant to attending to the
underlying causes of crime.

B. Why a Commitment to Free Will Makes Individuals Ignore the
Underlying Causes of Crime
Attentiveness to the ways in which such factors as social deprivation influence crime undoubtedly varies from person to person. Most of us are open to
the possibility that biological and environmental factors have at least some
causal role to play in human behavior. Some might even share the view of
mental health experts and criminologists that human behavior is substantially influenced by external factors. Thoroughgoing naturalists, of course,
are persuaded that factors like biology and environment fully determine
behavior. Although there is controversy about the precise causal mechanisms
of determination, there is general agreement amongst naturalists that factors
over which we lack direct control fully determine human conduct.
Nevertheless, significant portions of the population have a strong commitment to metaphysical free will and are prone to ignore the causal
relevance of other factors in crime. As the studies discussed in Part III
reveal, subjects resist portrayals of the criminal as driven by sociobiological
circumstance and tend to espouse a view of human behavior widely inconsistent with the view of criminologists and mental health experts."" This
folk tendency appears to have something to do with an exaggerated
115. The argument developed in this Part will not persuade everyone. To expect an
argument in the vein of a deductive proof from a moralist would be to misunderstand the
nature and purposes of moral enquiry. At the very least, the discussion here demonstrates
that there are plausible and compelling arguments for mitigation one can make that appeal
to the role of contextual factors in causing bad behavior, and that sentencing actors will be
unreasonably biased against such arguments if they have an exaggerated belief in free will.
n6. See supra Part Ill.B.
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conception of the role of free will in human behavior. In one study that
gave participants a choice to explain criminal conduct either in terms of free
will or as caused by external factors, 32 percent of 8oo participants stated
that criminal conduct is 0oopercent the result of free will rather than
factors like hard social conditions (the mean response attributed 76 percent
of the causal responsibility to the agent's will). 117 One need not endorse
a thoroughgoing naturalism to recognize that such results reflect folk beliefs
that are widely inconsistent with what we know already about human
psychology: it is well established that our thoughts, desires, and behavior
are heavily influenced by factors like biology and social circumstance.
Whereas the studies merely reflect a correlation between the folk belief in
free will and a resistance to contextual explanations of crime, the claim here is
that the two are directly linked: their commitment to metaphysically robust
free will makes individuals less likely to acknowledge the effects of hard social
conditions and biological predisposition on criminal behavior. Recall that on
the metaphysically robust conception of free will, we act freely when our
actions stem from a faculty that is undetermined by past events and natural
laws. This conception of an offender's behavior as spontaneously emanating from an undetermined faculty inside of him represents a very
different way of thinking than one that tries to relate the person's actions
to his context. 118 In terms of affixing causal responsibility, the significance we confer on the actor's undetermined "will" bears directly on the
perceived significance of the actor's situation, and vice versa-the more
situational factors are emphasized, the less an undetermined will can be.
As a result, an exaggerated belief that a person's "evil will" is fully
responsible for his behavior offers adjudicators a convenient theoretic
license to ignore the ways in which other factors contribute to crime. For
those sufficiently committed to metaphysically robust free will, data that
bears on the general likelihood of criminality in a population of offenders
affected by adverse circumstances becomes irrelevant and uninteresting, as
criminals are imagined to retain a freedom to choose otherwise no matter
how constraining their circumstances happen to be. Although someone
who believes in free will may take hard social conditions and other contextual factors seriously, the evidence suggests that people, generally,

117. Tygart, supra note 90.

118. On a similar point, see Daniel Glaser, Criminality Theories andBehavioralImages, 61
AM. J. Soc'Y 433, 434-45 (1956).
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overestimate the role of free will in human behavior. Instead of acknowledging the effects of contextual factors, people prefer to think of an agent's
evil will as primarily responsible for his or her conduct. As Nietzsche
observes, "freedom of will" is used to "absolve God, the world, ancestors,
chance, and society" from responsibility for human misbehavior." 9
We have at last arrived at a satisfactory conclusion about why individuals
tend to be harsher the more committed they are to the existence of free will.
A robust belief in free will makes individuals less likely to attend to contextual causes of crime. The more they privilege free will over contextual
factors in explanations of criminal behavior, the less attentive they are to
arguments for mitigation that appeal to the effects of contextual factors on
criminal behavior. In other words, the folk view of human agency veils moral
considerations that undermine our standing to exact retribution, considerations that once appreciated would lead to more restrained sentencing.
The revisionary potential of modern science thus lies in its ability to
challenge the folk view of human agency. As more people come to see the
deterministic underpinnings of human behavior and engage in the sort of
reflection that makes vivid the effects of contextual factors on human
misconduct, we will, as a society, become more empathetic in our treatment of criminals. The next and final Part enlarges on this final point: the
real corrective power of modern science derives from increasingly illustrative demonstrations of the fact that an "evil will" is not the only, or even the
usual, causal basis for criminal behavior.

V. MODERN SCIENCE AS A CORRECTIVE FORCE
The popular conception of the criminal actor is distorted and morally distorting. More often than not the offender is perceived as "free and autonomous," with little regard given to the role of such factors as social deprivation
and mental defect. This unrealistic conception of criminal agency generates
a moral blind spot; citizens fail to appreciate the complicitous role of the
social order and the unfair burdens imposed on criminals-appreciations
that would make them less punitive. The popular punitive instinct, uninhibited by moral inferences that depend on a realistic appraisal of human
up. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EvIL

[1886]).

z8

(Walter Kaufmann ed., 1966
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behavior, is given legal effect by way of the moral convictions of judges,
jurors, and legislators. The likely result is a sentencing regime that falls short
of the ideals of retributive proportionality and empathetic criminal justice.
The remedy does not have to be a widespread rejection of "free will."
Whereas an exaggerated belief in metaphysically robust freedom seems to
be at the root of the problem, the moral blind spot can be remedied
without having to persuade individuals of determinism's truth. As long
as more people begin to see that free will could not be the exclusive or even
most substantial driver of criminal behavior, we will, as a society, become
more attentive to the effects of factors like poverty and mental defect on an
individual's propensity to behave badly.
The fact that a wide-ranging renunciation of free will is not the only
solution to the problem diminishes an objection that might otherwise be
more of a concern. The worry might be raised that more accurate beliefs
about the causal underpinnings of human behavior could result in worse
moral adjudication. In particular, if people embrace "incompatibilism" in
response to finding out that human behavior is substantially influenced by
factors over which we lack control-a thesis that effectively absolves criminals of moral responsibility for their actions-there would appear to be a risk
that the criminal justice system will end up not punishing criminals enough.
The possibility that incompatibilism will be widely embraced fails to be
a serious concern. As is explained shortly, it seems unlikely that developments in science could persuade people to become full-fledged determinists. The far more likely scenario is that, by providing vivid
demonstrations of the effects of natural factors on criminal behavior, science will make the situational basis of human behavior more accessible to
the general public and those charged with making sentencing decisions.
Individuals will become more trusting of the deterministic explanation
without giving up on the possibility of free will entirely. This change will
be enough to make them sensitive to the moral considerations that have
been emphasized. At any rate, the evidence suggests that even if people
reject the possibility of free will altogether, they are unlikely to become
under-punishing incompatibilists. Studies indicate that although determinists punish less harshly, they continue to hold criminals morally responsible.' 20 The critic who thinks that more accurate beliefs about human

1zo.

See generally Nichols & Knobe, supra note 8o; infra Part III.B.
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agency result in worse moral adjudication bears the burden of specifying
the faulty inferences that would lead to defective sentencing.121
Neuroscience, in combination with behavioral genetics and sociology,
can be an important corrective force in this context. One possibility is that
the public, impressed with the growing successes of modern biological
science, will become increasingly accepting of its materialist and deterministic theoretical underpinnings. Those who accept the scientific conception
of the human, having rejected metaphysically suspect free will, will be
less biased against arguments for mitigation that appeal to the role of
contextual factors in causing bad behavior. This moral improvement will
in turn be manifested in the decisions of discretionary actors in the legal
system. A second possibility, one that seems more likely, is that modern
science will show with increasing specificity and clarity that contextual
factors are greater contributors to bad behavior than we tended to think.122
The general public, when they encounter such results, will tend to become
more sensitive to such factors in assessing the criminal responsibility of
those who behave badly. Even if they do not altogether give up on their
belief in free will, individuals will grant it less significance in their theories
of human behavior, which will in turn diminish their susceptibility to the
fundamental attribution error. 12 3 This will have a significant effect on the
legal system as it aligns the behavior of discretionary actors in the sentencing context more closely with the dictates of justice.
The second of the two long-term possibilities raised above seems especially
promising in light of recent developments in the labs and courtrooms.1 24
121. It is also worth emphasizing that the American criminal justice system is one of the
harshest in the world. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retribution, 7 BuFF.
CRIM. L. REv. 85, 86 (2004) (on the striking harshness of the United States when compared
with other developed nations). There appears to be relative consensus that some restraint
would be a good thing for criminal justice in America. Id at 88. The evidence reviewed in
Part II highlights some striking examples of patently disproportionate sentencing. An
embrace of determinism, to the extent that it undercuts the impulse to punish, would likely
bring the decisions of sentencing actors in the criminal justice system closer in line with the
dictates of justice.
122. Thanks to Gideon Yaffe for highlighting the differences between these two
possibilities.
123. People might adopt a more sophisticated version of libertarianism, which gives less
central a role to free will in explanations of human behavior, and acknowledges that factors
other than free will play a causal role.
124. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 16 (discussing two U.S. cases in which sentences were
reduced on grounds of genetic predisposition); Barbara Hagerty, Can your genes make you
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As a case study, consider the recognition by courts that a particular variant
in the gene for MAOA, a protein that plays an important role in the
brain, when combined with adverse environmental stimuli like childhood
maltreatment, warrants mitigation in sentencing.' 2 5 It has been argued
that this particular claim of genetic predisposition to crime is especially
believable in part because of advances in our understanding of the neurobiological mechanisms by which the MAOA variant confers risk: "it is
linked to a neuro-transmitted system and functional difference in brains
areas known to be involved in anger production and control."' 26 Correlations between the genotype and convictions for violent crime have been
known since 2002. 127 But by providing causal explanations and data on
this mechanism, neuroscience has made the claim of genetic predisposition more plausible.1 28 Indeed, one way in which modern science can
push society to take such explanations of criminal behavior more seriously is by fostering a causal understanding of exactly how biological and
environmental factors predispose individuals to crime.
Scholars have observed that the mitigating force of certain mental impairments along with the effects of poverty, marginalization, and substance
abuse are under-recognized or, worse, ignored by sanction-setting legislators and by our criminal law doctrines.' 2 9 The law's insensitivity does
not appear to be driven by an insufficiency of data showing, for example,
that various kinds of congenital disorders strongly predispose individuals

murder?, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (July 1, ZOIO), http://www.npr.org/tenplates/story/
story.php?storyld=i28o43329 (noting that the jury in State v. Waldroup took into account
evidence of genetic predisposition and childhood abuse to reduce charge from first degree
murder to voluntary manslaughter).
125. Baum, supra note 16.
126. Id at 18.
127. Id at 6 (describing the studies).
Lz8. Id at 18 (observing that knowledge of neurological mechanism makes the MAOA
predisposition claim more believable).
529. See Benjamin L. Berger, Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in Criminal
Law, in RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: NEW CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF DOMESTIC, TRANSNATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAQ 117

(Francois T. Renaud & James Stribopoulos eds., zon); Watson, supra note 36; Kaye, supra,
note34, at 421-23; discussion supra note ny. See generally Bazelon, supranote so6 (describing
cases that illustrate the way in which situational factors like social deprivation and mental
defect reduce the offender's moral culpability, and observing that these factors are underrecognized in American sentencing).
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to crime and ought to bear on their culpability.'13 As the neurobiological
sciences provide greater specificity on the mechanisms of predisposition,
sentencing actors will be less able to justify ignoring the mitigating character of such factors. Modern biological science will force us to think long
and hard about our traditional intransigence in the face of facts that
militate for mitigation and punitive restraint.
While reformists wait for the gradual change in people's attitudes, they
can make more immediate and targeted demands for change. Reformists
can reasonably argue that rule drafters should set sentences with an awareness of the free will bias. When deciding whether neuroimaging results
would be more prejudicial than probative if allowed into courtrooms,
judges should consider the positive de-biasing effect the studies might have
on the jury. One could argue that prosecutors should be prevented from
prejudicing the jury with claims like "the defendant's crime stems entirely
from his evil makeup"-claims that exploit and aggravate the effects of the
attribution error. 13 1 Other de-biasing strategies might be pursued via jury
instruction.
Even though it is difficult to assess the degree to which reformist aspirations might in the end be realized, the primary focus of this article has been
to redeem the reformist agenda. The argument has aimed at vindicating the
basic reformist thesis that the scientific, biodeterministic worldview is in
tension with the way we currently punish and ought to be marshalled
toward attempts at reforming criminal law for the better. It has, one hopes,
presented a way of thinking about the reformist position that is not vulnerable to the old objections-that reformism wrongly reads metaphysical
content into criminal law doctrine, or is animated by a radical and suspect
moral thesis about the justificatory principles of punishment, one that
denies the possibility of deserved punishment altogether.

130. See, e.g., Berger, supra, note 129 (discussing evidence of the predisposing effects of
FASD and other disorders); Kaye, supra note 34, at 396-98, 411 n.2o5 (noting the law's
reluctance to acknowledge the mitigating effect of social deprivation); Amanda R. Evansburg, "But Your Honor, It's in His Genes': The Casefor Genetic Impairments as Groundsfor
a DownwardDeparture Under the FederalSentencingGuidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1565
(2001).
131. See Haney, supra note 99.
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CONCLUSION

Do problematic assumptions about free will influence criminal law and
sentencing? This article answers in the affirmative, and does so in a way that
avoids the vulnerabilities of traditional reformist critiques. The criminal
justice system defers to key actors in the sentencing process on outcomecontrolling moral judgments. The relevant judgments about proportionality and mitigation in sentencing cannot be reached without reference to
the adjudicator's own understanding of human agency. The evidence suggests that a "free will"-based worldview biases adjudicators in the direction
of harsher punishment by causing them to be unreasonably resistant to
arguments for mitigation that appeal to the role of contextual factors in
causing bad behavior. By ignoring contextual explanations for why criminals behave the way they do, individuals remain blind to the the failures of
the social order and the unfair disadvantages incurred by marginalized
criminals-considerations that undermine our standing to exact retribution. It is in these situations that the radical reformist thesis is most relevant: modern science, by challenging folk theories of human behavior, will
foster a greater consciousness of the contextual causes of crime and, in turn,
have a corrective and morally auspicious effect on the sentencing decisions
of discretionary actors.
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